If you’re exploring alternatives to 1Password, you’re usually balancing several practical goals: strong encryption, smooth daily use, reliable passkey handling, sharing and recovery options, cross-device sync, and—more recently—how credentials can be delegated to AI agents without exposing the underlying secret. 1Password’s October 2026 releases expanded both sides of that comparison: full passkey create, manage, and sign-in support arrived in the stable browser extension, while 1Password for Agents introduced an approval-based way for supported personal agents to sign in without seeing the password or one-time code.
Table of Contents
Alternatives Table
This table focuses on documented security design, passkey handling, plan structure, and the credential workflows that now matter when comparing a password manager with 1Password. Passkey support is not treated as a simple yes-or-no feature: creating, storing, signing in, sharing, and moving passkeys can differ between products.
| App | Documented Encryption / Key Protection | Open Source Signal | Passkey Handling | Agent Credential Position | Best-Fit Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bitwarden | End-to-end encryption, client-side keys, published security documentation | Yes | Create, store, use, view, and delete passkeys across supported clients; mobile Credential Exchange support can move passkeys between compatible apps | Separate developer and secrets products are available; evaluate them separately from personal vault sign-in delegation | Value-focused users, open-source preference, self-hosting, and clear controls |
| Proton Pass | End-to-end encryption with an emphasis on protecting passwords and item metadata | Yes | Create and sign in with passkeys through supported browser and mobile apps; passkeys can be stored, shared, and exported | AI access tokens can grant agents scoped vault access with expiration and access logs | Privacy-oriented users and people who want an explicit AI-agent credential model |
| NordPass | XChaCha20-Poly1305 for documented local key protection; Argon2id key derivation | Not positioned primarily as open-source-first | Stores and manages passkeys across browser, mobile, desktop, and web-vault environments | No equivalent personal-agent sign-in flow is used as a comparison point here | Users who prefer a straightforward interface and clearly documented cryptographic choices |
| Keeper | Zero-knowledge architecture with documented encryption and enterprise controls | Not positioned primarily as open-source-first | Create, store, and sign in with passkeys through supported browser and mobile clients; passkey records can be shared through Keeper | Enterprise secret and access products exist, but personal-agent login delegation should be evaluated separately | Organizations prioritizing administration, access control, and deployment options |
| LastPass | PBKDF2-SHA256 plus AES-256 vault encryption in its documented security model | Not positioned primarily as open-source-first | Can store and use passkeys for supported sites; current documented limits include no passkey sharing and no CSV passkey import/export | No comparable 1Password for Agents flow is used as a primary product feature here | Users who want familiar password-manager workflows |
| Dashlane | AES-256-CBC with HMAC-SHA256 in its current zero-knowledge architecture documentation | Not positioned primarily as open-source-first | Create, store, sync, use, manage, and delete passkeys; Credential Exchange can move passkeys between participating managers, but passkey sharing is not currently supported | Business security and risk controls are stronger comparison points than personal-agent credential delegation | Business environments and policy-oriented deployments |
Bitwarden documents its encryption, key handling, and account architecture in a public security whitepaper. [Bitwarden security model]
What Sets 1Password Apart as a Baseline
When people compare alternatives to 1Password, they often treat 1Password as a reference point for account security design. One distinctive element is the Secret Key: an additional high-entropy secret combined with the account password as part of the account-protection model. 1Password documents the Secret Key as a 128-bit value that helps protect encrypted account data even if an attacker obtains information associated with the account password. [Secret Key security]
That does not automatically make another secure vault weaker. Alternatives use different combinations of strong key derivation, device-bound keys, local encryption, recovery controls, and authentication methods. The useful question is which security model matches the way you actually sign in, recover access, share items, manage passkeys, and authorize other software to use credentials.
October 2026 changes affect the baseline. Version 8.12.42 of the stable 1Password browser extension added full support for creating, managing, and signing in with passkeys on supported sites. Two days later, 1Password announced 1Password for Agents, an opt-in layer that lets supported personal AI agents request an approved login while 1Password fills the credential without exposing the password or one-time code to the agent. [Passkey release] [1Password for Agents]
Security Models That Matter in Real Comparisons
Most established password managers aim to protect vault contents with client-side encryption. The differences are typically in key derivation, key storage, recovery, authentication, passkey portability, sharing, and enterprise controls. Compare the details behind a vendor’s security label rather than treating terms such as “zero knowledge” as interchangeable.
Key Derivation and Local Key Protection
Key derivation functions make offline guessing more expensive by adding computational work to each attempt. Some vendors document their choices and parameters more clearly than others. NordPass, for example, describes using Argon2id with a salt to derive a master key and XChaCha20-Poly1305 to protect its private key locally. [NordPass security]
What Gets Encrypted
Vault contents are the obvious target, but metadata can also disclose information about the accounts a person uses. Proton Pass explicitly states that its end-to-end encryption extends beyond passwords to additional item data and metadata that Proton cannot read. If metadata privacy is part of the threat model, that distinction can matter more than small interface differences. [Proton Pass security]
Zero-Knowledge Claims Need Technical Detail
“Zero knowledge” is commonly used to describe a design where the provider should not be able to read the user’s encrypted vault. The implementation behind that statement matters. LastPass publishes documentation describing its PBKDF2-SHA256 password processing and AES-256 vault encryption, while Dashlane’s newer 2026 architecture documentation describes local AES-256-CBC + HMAC-SHA256 encryption, device binding, separate encryption and authentication layers, and confidential-computing components for selected enterprise functions. [LastPass security] [Dashlane architecture]
Feature Differences That Usually Decide the Switch
A secure vault can be technically strong and still be a poor daily fit. Sharing rules, account recovery, browser behavior, passkey portability, administrator policies, and delegated access now affect the result as much as password autofill.
Sharing and Access Control
If you share credentials with family or teammates, check permission granularity, group-based sharing, individual-item sharing, and whether ownership is attached to vaults, collections, folders, or users. For business use, role controls, provisioning, audit activity, and the ability to revoke access centrally usually matter more than extra item templates.
Business Integrations and Provisioning
For teams, check SSO, SCIM or directory provisioning, administrator roles, activity logs, device management, and policy enforcement. Dashlane’s current security documentation, for example, describes SAML SSO, SCIM provisioning, role-based access, activity logs, policy controls, and enterprise credential-risk features. [Dashlane enterprise controls]
Passkey Handling Is Now a Core Password-Manager Test
Passkeys are no longer a side feature in this category. The useful comparison is whether a manager can create, store, sync, use, manage, share, and move passkeys on the devices that matter to you. A separate question is whether a passkey can unlock the password manager itself; that is different from storing a passkey for another website.
On October 20, 2026, the stable 1Password browser extension added full passkey support. Users can create and sign in with passkeys directly from the extension, while 1Password apps can display, organize, move, delete, and share stored passkeys. Watchtower can also identify existing logins for sites that support upgrading to a passkey. [Current browser release]
| Manager | Create / Store | Sign In to Websites | Sharing / Portability Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1Password | Yes, including the stable browser extension and supported apps | Yes | Stored passkeys can be shared; Credential Exchange can move passkeys from supported iOS and Android environments, while desktop file export does not currently export passkeys |
| Bitwarden | Yes | Yes | Passkeys are included in supported Bitwarden export/import paths; mobile Credential Exchange is available on supported operating-system versions |
| Proton Pass | Yes | Yes | Proton documents passkey sharing and export; browser, iOS, and Android are supported |
| NordPass | Yes | Yes | Passkeys are stored and managed across NordPass clients; verify portability requirements before a large migration |
| Keeper | Yes | Yes | Keeper documents passkeys in browser and mobile clients and allows passkey records to be shared through its vault model |
| LastPass | Yes | Yes | Current documentation says passkeys cannot be shared and are not imported or exported through CSV |
| Dashlane | Yes | Yes | Credential Exchange can move passkeys between supported managers; passkey sharing is still listed as unavailable |
Bitwarden documents passkey creation and authentication in its browser extension and supported mobile apps, including Credential Exchange support on newer iOS and Android releases. Proton Pass supports creating and using passkeys in its browser and mobile clients and lists sharing and export among its passkey functions. Keeper and Dashlane also support passkey creation and sign-in across supported clients. [Bitwarden passkeys] [Proton Pass passkeys] [Keeper passkeys] [Dashlane passkeys]
Migration detail: 1Password currently exports passkeys through Credential Exchange on supported iOS and Android versions. Its normal desktop 1PUX or CSV export does not carry passkeys, so a desktop-only migration may require recreating them on the original websites. [1Password export limits]
Agent Credential Delegation Is a New Comparison Layer
AI agents create a credential problem that normal autofill was not designed to solve. An agent may need to sign in to a website to book a trip, schedule an appointment, submit an expense, or work through another authenticated service. Giving the agent a password in a prompt exposes the secret, while requiring the user to take over every browser session removes much of the automation benefit.
1Password for Agents, announced October 22, 2026, takes an approval-based approach. A supported agent asks 1Password for a login when it reaches a sign-in page. The user sees which agent is requesting access and which login is suggested, then approves or denies the request. After approval, 1Password fills and submits the username, password, and supported one-time code directly into the agent’s browser session while the integration is designed to keep the credential and sign-in page hidden from the agent. [Agent sign-in flow]
- Approval model
- The agent requests a login and the user approves a specific credential before sign-in.
- Secret exposure
- 1Password fills the approved username, password, and supported one-time code without requiring the user to paste them into the agent chat.
- Vault access
- Connecting an agent does not give it general access to 1Password vaults.
- Current availability
- The support documentation currently lists Muse and Grok Bot as available integrations, with other announced partners following separately.
- Account scope
- Current support is for Individual and Family accounts on 1Password.com; Teams, Business, 1Password.ca, and 1Password.eu accounts are not currently included.
- Credential limits
- The current agent flow supports usernames, passwords, and one-time passwords from Login items in Personal or Private vaults. Passkeys, shared-vault items, and sign-in-provider logins are not yet supported in this flow.
The distinction between passkey handling and agent credential delegation is important. 1Password can now manage passkeys for normal human sign-in, but those passkeys are not currently available through 1Password for Agents. A buyer that depends heavily on agent automation should test the exact credential types the agent needs rather than assume that every item stored in the vault can be delegated.
Proton Pass Uses a Different Agent Model
Proton Pass is a particularly relevant alternative because it also has a dedicated AI-agent access model. Its access tokens can be scoped to selected vaults, assigned an expiration ranging from one hour to one year, revoked, and reviewed through an activity history. Proton states that an agent must provide a reason when it accesses a credential, creating an auditable record. The agent retrieves permitted credentials through Proton Pass tooling rather than using the same approval-and-fill design as 1Password for Agents. [Proton agent access]
| Area | 1Password for Agents | Proton Pass Access Tokens |
|---|---|---|
| Authorization model | User approves the requested login when the supported agent needs to sign in | User creates an access token and scopes it to selected vaults |
| Credential exposure model | 1Password fills the login into the partner-controlled sign-in environment without exposing it to the agent model | Agent access is mediated through Pass access tokens and Pass tooling with scoped vault permissions |
| Time limit | Approval applies to the requested sign-in; website session duration is then controlled by the destination service | Token expiration can be configured |
| Audit information | User can see which agent is requesting access and approve or deny the login | Credential access is logged with a stated reason for each agent access |
| Current scope | Supported personal agent integrations; Individual and Family accounts on 1Password.com | Available on listed paid Proton Pass and Proton Workspace plans |
This is not a reason to reduce a password-manager decision to “has AI-agent support.” The useful questions are narrower: Can an agent access only the credentials it needs? Does the agent ever receive the plaintext secret? Is every use approved or logged? Can access expire? Can it be revoked instantly? Which vaults and item types are eligible?
Pricing and Plan Logic
Pricing comparisons work best when normalized into the same unit: per user, per month, billed annually, with the difference between promotional pricing and renewal pricing kept visible.
At the current 2026 pricing level, 1Password lists its regular Individual price at $3.99 per month billed annually (about $47.88 per year) and Families at $5.99 per month billed annually for up to five members (about $71.88 per year). At review time, the site also displayed first-year promotional prices for new direct subscribers of $2.99 and $4.49 per month respectively. Treat those introductory amounts separately from the normal renewal price. [1Password pricing]
Bitwarden provides a different price structure: its core password manager remains available free, while Premium is currently listed at $19.80 per year and Families at $47.88 per year for up to six users. The business tiers add centralized management, directory synchronization, provisioning, and other organizational controls. [Bitwarden pricing]
Proton Pass also offers a free tier, but agent credential access is tied to listed paid plans such as Pass Plus, Pass Family, Proton Unlimited, Pass Professional, and Workspace Standard. A team comparing AI-agent access should therefore price the feature at the plan where it actually becomes available rather than comparing only each vendor’s cheapest vault tier. [Proton agent plan availability]
Practical pricing check: If you need team provisioning, policy enforcement, centralized administration, passkey controls, or credential access for agents, compare the plan that includes those features rather than the consumer starting price. For personal use, compare multi-device sync, sharing, passkey portability, recovery, and any security-monitoring features you would actually use.
Which Alternative Matches Your Use Case
The alternatives below make sense for different reasons. Security architecture is only one part of the choice; passkey portability, agent access, recovery, self-hosting, administration, and the surrounding privacy ecosystem can change which product fits.
Bitwarden
Bitwarden is often shortlisted when people want a clear value model, an established free tier, open-source code, self-hosting options, and published security documentation. Its current passkey implementation covers creation and sign-in across supported browser and mobile clients, and newer mobile releases support moving credentials through Credential Exchange. Official site: Bitwarden
Proton Pass
Proton Pass tends to appeal to users who want encrypted vault functionality plus a broader privacy ecosystem. Its passkey support covers browser and mobile use, and its current product can share and export passkeys. Proton is also the clearest direct comparison in this list for AI-agent credential delegation because access tokens can be scoped, expired, revoked, and audited. Official site: Proton Pass
NordPass
NordPass is a common pick for people who want a straightforward interface and vendor-written explanations of cryptographic choices such as Argon2id and XChaCha20-Poly1305. Passkey management is available across its mobile app, browser extension, web vault, and desktop application, so it is worth testing on every operating system used by the household or organization. Official site: NordPass
Keeper
Keeper is frequently evaluated where administrator controls, documentation depth, sharing, and enterprise deployment patterns matter. Its passkey support extends through browser and mobile clients, and Keeper documents passkey records as shareable through its vault model. Official site: Keeper
Keeper maintains a detailed encryption-model guide for teams that want to inspect the architecture rather than rely on high-level security labels. [Keeper encryption model]
LastPass
LastPass remains a familiar option for users who want conventional password-manager workflows and published technical details around PBKDF2-SHA256 and AES-256. Its passkey implementation can store and use passkeys across supported environments, but current documentation lists several portability limits: passkeys cannot be shared, copied, or moved through CSV, and a passkey stored in the vault cannot currently replace the master-password login to LastPass itself. Official site: LastPass
Dashlane
Dashlane is commonly compared by teams that want business administration and modern credential-risk controls. Its 2026 security documentation describes a zero-knowledge architecture with local vault encryption and device-bound account controls. Passkeys can be created, used, synchronized, managed, and moved through Credential Exchange with participating managers, although passkey sharing is still listed as unavailable. Official site: Dashlane
Migration Notes That Impact Outcomes
Switching password managers is mostly about reducing friction while keeping vault integrity intact. Passwords and notes are usually easier to move than permissions, passkeys, recovery settings, trusted devices, and agent integrations.
- Field mapping: some apps store items as flexible templates while others use stricter categories. This affects custom fields, one-time codes, attachments, and unusual item types.
- Sharing model: vault-based, collection-based, and item-based sharing behave differently. Confirm how permissions and ownership should be rebuilt.
- Recovery options: compare what happens when a device, master password, recovery code, Secret Key, or trusted family administrator is unavailable.
- KDF and lock behavior: confirm unlock frequency, biometric behavior, timeout rules, and what remains available offline.
- Passkeys: verify whether the destination can import them directly. 1Password desktop exports currently do not move passkeys, while supported mobile Credential Exchange can.
- Credential portability: do not assume a CSV file contains everything in a vault. Passkeys, custom fields, attachments, linked items, and sharing metadata often use separate migration paths.
- Agent integrations: if an AI agent currently signs in through 1Password for Agents or Proton Pass access tokens, inventory the agents, eligible vaults, approval rules, token expiration, and activity history before switching.
Password guidance has also changed. NIST SP 800-63B-4 superseded the older SP 800-63B guidance in 2025. For passwords used as a single authentication factor, the current requirement sets a 15-character minimum, rejects common or compromised values through blocklists, prohibits mandatory composition rules, and says routine periodic password changes should not be required. Passwords are also explicitly described as not phishing-resistant, which is one reason passkeys now deserve their own line in a password-manager comparison. [Current NIST guidance]
Frequently Asked Questions
Is there a “best” alternative to 1Password?
It depends on the requirement. Bitwarden is a strong comparison for open-source access, free and low-cost plans, and self-hosting. Proton Pass combines a privacy-focused ecosystem with passkeys and dedicated AI-agent access tokens. Keeper and Dashlane are more relevant when business administration and policy controls matter. Passkey portability, recovery, sharing, and agent access should be tested alongside encryption.
Do all password managers use end-to-end encryption?
Many established password managers encrypt vault data on the client before synchronization, but terminology and architecture differ. Read the provider’s current security documentation and check where keys are derived, where data is decrypted, how recovery works, and which metadata remains visible to the service.
Can 1Password now create and use passkeys?
Yes. The stable 1Password browser extension added full passkey support on October 20, 2026. It can create and sign in with passkeys on supported sites, while 1Password apps can manage stored passkeys. Passkey portability still depends on platform: Credential Exchange can move them from supported mobile environments, while standard desktop exports do not currently include them.
Does 1Password for Agents give an AI agent my password?
The current design is intended to avoid that. A supported agent requests a login, the user approves the requested credential, and 1Password fills the username, password, and supported one-time code into the agent’s browser environment without requiring the password to be placed in the agent chat. The current feature is opt-in and supports only specified account types, agents, vaults, and credential formats.
Which 1Password alternative also supports AI-agent credential access?
Proton Pass has a dedicated model based on AI access tokens. Tokens can be limited to selected vaults, given an expiration, revoked, and reviewed through activity logs that record credential access and its stated reason. It differs from 1Password’s request-and-fill approach, so teams should compare how much direct credential access the agent receives and how approvals are handled.
Are passkeys replacing password managers?
Passkeys reduce dependence on passwords for services that support them, but password managers still store recovery codes, secure notes, identities, payment data, shared credentials, passwords for older systems, and other account records. Password managers are also becoming passkey managers, so passkey creation, synchronization, sharing, and portability are now part of the selection decision.